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Abstract
Why is a given node in a time-evolving graph (t-graph)
marked as an anomaly by an off-the-shelf detection al-
gorithm? Is it because of the number of its outgoing or
incoming edges, or their timings? How can we best con-
vince a human analyst that the node is anomalous? Our
work aims to provide succinct, interpretable, and simple
explanations of anomalous behavior in t-graphs (com-
munications, IP-IP interactions, etc.) while respecting
the limited attention of human analysts. Specifically, we
extract key features from such graphs, and propose to
output a few pair (scatter) plots from this feature space
which “best” explain known anomalies. To this end, our
work has four main contributions: (a) problem formu-
lation: we introduce an “analyst-friendly” problem for-
mulation for explaining anomalies via pair plots, (b) ex-
planation algorithm: we propose a plot-selection ob-
jective and the LookOut algorithm to approximate it
with optimality guarantees, (c) generality: our expla-
nation algorithm is both domain- and detector-agnostic,
and (d) scalability: we show that LookOut scales lin-
early on the number of edges of the input graph. Our
experiments show that LookOut performs near-ideally
in terms of maximizing explanation objective on sev-
eral real datasets including Enron e-mail and DBLP
coauthorship. Furthermore, LookOut produces fast,
visually interpretable and intuitive results in explain-
ing “ground-truth” anomalies from Enron, DBLP and
LBNL (computer network) data.
1 Introduction
Given a time-evolving graph (hereafter referred to as a
t-graph) in the form 〈source, destination, timestamp,
value〉 (such as IP-IP communications in bits or user-
merchant spendings in dollars over time), and a list of
anomalous nodes (identified by an off-the-shelf “black-
box” detector or any other external mechanism), how
can we explain the anomalies to a human analyst in a
succinct, effective, and interpretable fashion?
Anomaly detection is a widely studied problem.
Numerous detectors exist for point data [2, 6, 19], time
!Name ! ! !Score!
!****************** ! !********!
!Skilling,!Jeff ! !0.893!
!Lay,!Kenneth ! !0.761!
!Fastow,!Andrew !0.442!
!Mark,!Rebecca !0.429!
!Smith,!John ! !0.331!
!Cooper,!Stephen !0.308!
!Tomson,!Mary! !0.232!
!... ! ! ! !...!
TradiMonal:!
!!"verbal"
"!"lengthy"
"!"no"explana1on"
Proposed:!
!!"visual"
"!"succinct"
"!"interpretable"
Figure 1: LookOut explains Enron founder/CEO
“Ken Lay” and COO “Jeff Skilling” by two “pair plots”
in which they are most salient. Compared to traditional
ranked list output (left), LookOut produces simpler,
more interpretable explanations (right).
series [13], as well as graphs [3, 4]. However, the lit-
erature on anomaly explanation or description is per-
haps surprisingly sparse. Given that the outcomes (i.e.
alerts) of a detector often go through a “vetting” pro-
cedure by human analysts, it is extremely beneficial to
provide explanations for such alerts which can empower
analysts in sensemaking and reduce their efforts in trou-
bleshooting and recovery. Moreover, such explanations
should justify the anomalies as succinctly as possible in
order to save analyst time.
Our work sets out to address the anomaly expla-
nation problem, with a focus on time-evolving graphs.
Consider the following example situation: Given the
IP-IP communications over time from an institution, a
network analyst could face two relevant scenarios.
• Detected anomalies: For monitoring, s/he could use
any “black-box” anomaly detector to spot suspi-
cious IPs. Here, we are oblivious to the specific
detector, knowing only that it flags anomalies, but
does not produce any interpretable explanation.
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• Dictated anomalies: Alternatively, anomalous IPs
may get reported to the analyst externally (e.g.,
they crash or get compromised).
In both scenarios, the analyst would be interested in un-
derstanding in what ways the pre-identified anomalous
IPs (detected or dictated) differ from the rest.
In this work, we propose a new approach called
LookOut, for explaining a given set of anomalies, and
apply it to the scope of t-graphs. At its heart, Look-
Out provides interpretable visual explanations through
simple, easy-to-grasp plots, which “incriminate” the
given anomalies the most. We summarize our contri-
butions as follows.
• Anomaly Explanation Problem Formulation:
We introduce a new formulation that explains
anomalies through “pair plots”. In a nutshell, given
the list of anomalies from a t-graph, we aim to
find a few pair plots on which the total “blame”
that the anomalies receive is maximized. Our
emphasis is on two key aspects: (a) interpretability :
our plots visually incriminate the anomalies, and
(b) succinctness: we show only a few plots to
respect the analyst’s attention; the analysts can
then quickly interpret the plots, spot the outliers,
and verify their abnormality given the discovered
feature pairs.
• Succinct Explanation Algorithm LookOut:
We propose the LookOut algorithm to solve our
explanation problem. Specifically, we develop a
plot selection objective that lends itself to mono-
tone submodular function optimization, which we
solve efficiently with optimality guarantees. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates LookOut’s performance on the
Enron communications network, where it discov-
ers two pair plots which maximally incriminate the
given anomalous nodes: Enron founder “Ken Lay”
and CEO “Jeff Skilling.” Note that the anomalies
stand out visually from the normal nodes.
• Generality: LookOut is general in two respects:
it is (a) domain-agnostic, meaning it is suitable
for real-world t-graphs from various domains that
involve human actors, and (2) detector-agnostic,
meaning it can be employed to explain anomalies
produced by any detector or identified through
any other mechanism (e.g., crash reports, customer
complaints, etc.)
• Scalability: We show that LookOut requires
time linear on the number of edges in the input t-
graph, which is simply the cost incurred to compute
feature values. In fact, the pair plot scoring and
selection steps are carefully designed to add only a
constant cost, which is independent of graph size
(see Lemma 3.1 and Fig. 4).
Table 1: Symbols and Definitions
Symbol Definition
G Input graph, G = (V, E), |V| = n, |E| = m
A Input anomalies, |A| = k
F Set of node features, |F| = d
P Set of pair plots, |P| = d(d− 1)/2 = l
si,j Anomaly score of ai ∈ A in plot pj ∈ P
S Subset of selected plots
f(S) Explanation objective function
∆f (p | S) Marginal gain of plot p w.r.t S
b Budget, i.e., maximum cardinality of S
We experiment with real t-graph datasets from di-
verse domains including e-mail and IP-IP communica-
tions, as well as co-authorships over time, which demon-
strate the effectiveness, interpretability, succinctness
and generality of our approach.
Reproducibility: LookOut is open-sourced
at https://github.com/NikhilGupta1997/Lookout,
and our datasets are publicly available (See Section 4.1).
2 Preliminaries and Problem Statement
2.1 Notation Formally, a t-graph is a collection of
time-ordered edges G(Vs ∪ Vd, E) = {e1, e2, . . .} where
each edge e ∈ E is a tuple 〈vs, vd, ts, val〉. Here, vs ∈ Vs
and vd ∈ Vd are the source and destination nodes of
e, ts is the time stamp associated with e, and val
is a value on e. For unipartite graphs (like IP-IP)
Vs = Vd, and for bipartite graphs (like user-ATM)
Vs∩Vd = ∅. Edge value could be categorical (edge type,
e.g., withdrawal vs. deposit) or numerical (edge weight,
e.g., dollar amount). We denote the number of nodes
by |Vs∪Vd| = |V| = n. We refer to the number of edges
|E| = m as the size of G. Note that such graphs can
be considered multigraphs, as multiple edges between
vs and vd are permitted.
The set of anomalous nodes given as input is
denoted by A ⊂ V, |A| = k. For bipartite graphs,
anomalies could be suspicious sources (e.g., users) A ⊂
Vs or destinations (e.g., ATMs) A ⊂ Vd.
To characterize the anomalies in t-graphs, we use
a list of features for each node, denoted by F =
{f1, f2, . . . , fd}. We describe our node features next.
2.2 Features for t-graphs We characterize the
nodes in a time-evolving graph with numerical prop-
erties they exhibit, and explain node anomalies using
these derived features. The literature is rich on feature
extraction from graphs [3, 14, 11, 25, 24, 12].
Oddball [3] introduced and successfully used vari-
ous relational features for anomaly detection in static
weighted graphs. We leverage several of these fea-
tures including (1) indegree, (2) outdegree, (3)
inweight-v, and (4) outweight-v, where weight of an
edge 〈vs, vd, ts, val〉 is the value val. Since we work with
temporal graphs, we also use (5) inweight-r and (6)
outweight-r, where edge weight depicts the number of
repetitions of the edge (multi-edge).
In addition to structure, we have the time informa-
tion. To this end, we leverage the inter-arrival times
(IAT) between the edges. IAT distributions have been
successfully used in a number of prior works on fraud de-
tection [11, 25]. We specifically use: IAT (7) average,
(8) variance, (9-11) minimum, median, and maximum.
We also define (12) lifetime, the gap between the first
and the last edge.
Admittedly, there are numerous other features one
could extract from graphs. In this work, our focus is
on the explanation problem, and thus we mainly build
on existing features that were shown to be useful in
prior anomaly and fraud detection tasks. One could
easily extend our list with others, such as recursive
structural features [14] or node embeddings [24, 12], but
we recommend using interpretable features that have
direct meanings for analyst benefit, as well as scalable
to compute for large graphs.
2.3 Intuition & Proposed Problem The expla-
nations we seek to generate should be simple and in-
terpretable. Moreover, they should be easy to illus-
trate to humans who will ultimately leverage the ex-
planations. To this end, we decide to use “pair plots”
(=scatter plots) for anomaly justification, due to their
visual appeal and interpretability. That is, we consider(
d
2
)
= d(d−1)2 2-d spaces by generating all pairwise fea-
ture combinations. Within each 2-d space, we then score
the nodes in A by their anomalousness (Section 3.1).
Let us denote the set of all
(
d
2
)
pair plots by P. Even
for small values of d, showing all the pair plots would
be too overwhelming for the analyst. Moreover, some
anomalies could redundantly show up in multiple plots.
Ideally, we would identify only a few pair plots, which
could “blame” or “explain away” the anomalies to the
largest possible extent. In other words, our goal would
be to output a small subset S of P, on which nodes in
A receive high anomaly scores (Section 3.2).
Given this intuition, we formulate our problem:
Problem 1. (Anomaly Explanation) • Given
(a) a list of anomalous nodes A ⊂ V from a t-
graph, either (1) detected by an off-the-shelf
detector or (2) dictated by external informa-
tion, and
(b) a fixed budget of b pair plots;
• find the best such pair plots S ⊂ P, |S| = b
• to maximize the total maximum anomaly score of
anomalies that we can “blame” through the b plots.
3 Proposed Algorithm LookOut
In this section, we detail our approach for scoring the
input anomalies by pair plots, our selection criterion and
algorithm for choosing pair plots, the overall complexity
analysis of LookOut, and conclude with discussion.
3.1 Scoring by Feature Pairs Given all the nodes
V, with marked anomalies A ⊂ V, and their extracted
features F ∈ Rd, our first step is to quantify how much
“blame” we can attribute to each input anomaly in R2.
As previously mentioned, 2-d spaces are easy to illus-
trate visually with pair plots. Moreover, anomalies in 2-
d are easy to interpret: e.g., “point a has too many/too
little y=dollars for its x=number of accounts”. Given
a pair plot, an analyst can easily discern the anomalies
visually, and come up with such explanations without
any further supervision.
We construct 2-d spaces (fx, fy) by pairing the
features ∀x, y = {1, . . . , d}, x 6= y. Each pair plot
pj ∈ P corresponds to such a pair of features, j =
{1, . . . , (d2)}. For scoring, we consider two different
scenarios, depending on how the input anomalies were
obtained.
If the anomalies are detected by some “black-box”
detector available to the analyst, we can employ the
same detector on all the nodes (this time in 2-d) and
thus obtain the scores for the nodes in A.
If the anomalies are dictated, i.e. reported exter-
nally, then the analyst could use any off-the-shelf de-
tector, such as LOF [6], DB-outlier [16], etc. In this
work, we use the Isolation Forest (iForest) detector [19]
for two main reasons: (a) it boasts constant training
time and space complexity due to its sampling strategy,
and (b) it has been shown empirically to outperform
alternatives [10] and is thus state-of-the-art. However,
note that none of these existing detectors has the abil-
ity to explain the outliers, especially iForest, as it is an
ensemble approach.
By the end of the scoring process, each anomaly
receives a total of |P| = l scores.
3.2 Explaining by Pair Plots While scoring in
small, 2-d spaces is easy and can be trivially parallelized,
presenting all such pair plots to the analyst would not
be productive given their limited attention budget. As
such, our next step is to carefully select a short list
of plots that best blame all the anomalies collectively,
where the plot budget can be specified by the user.
While selecting plots for justification, we aim to
incorporate the following criteria:
• incrimination power; such that the anomalies
are scored as highly as possible,
• high expressiveness; where each plot incrimi-
Figure 2: LookOut selection with k = 4 anomalies,
l = 3 plots, and budget b = 2. P1 is picked first due
to maximum total incrimination (2.9) (sum of incoming
edge weights). Next P3 is chosen over P2, due to higher
marginal gain (0.4 vs 0.2).
nates multiple anomalies, so that the explanation
is sublinear in the number of anomalies, and
• low redundancy; such that the plots do not
repeatedly explain similar sets of anomalies.
We next introduce our objective criterion which satisfies
the above requirements.
3.2.1 Objective function At this step of the pro-
cess, we can conceptually think of a complete, weighted
bipartite graph between the k input anomalies A =
{a1, . . . , ak} and l pair plots P = {p1, . . . , pl}, in which
edge weight si,j depicts the anomaly score that ai re-
ceived from pj , as illustrated in Fig. 2.
We formulate our objective to maximize the total
maximum score of each anomaly amongst the selected
plots, as given in Eq. (3.1):
(3.1) max
S⊂P,|S|=b
f(S) =
∑
ai∈A
max
pj∈S
si,j
Here, f(S) can be considered the total incrimination
score given by subset S. Since we are limited with a
budget of plots, we aim to select those which explain
multiple anomalies to the best extent. Note that each
anomaly receives their maximum score from exactly one
of the plots among the selected set, which effectively
partitions the explanations and avoids redundancy. In
the example Fig. 2, P1 and P3 “explain away” anoma-
lies {1, 2, 3} and {4} respectively, where the maximum
score that each anomaly receives is highlighted in red
font.
Concretely, we denote by Ap the set of anomalies
that receive their highest score from p, i.e. Ap = {ai|p =
maxpj∈S si,j}, where we break ties at random. Note
that Ap ∩ Ap′ = ∅, ∀p, p′ ∈ P. In depicting a plot p to
Algorithm 1 LookOut
Input: anomalies A, plots P, budget b
Output: set of selected plots S
1: initialize S → ∅
2: calculate ∆f (p | S) ∀ p ∈ P
3: generate sorted queue Q on marginal gains
4: while |S| < b do
5: ptop := pop from Q
6: update ∆f (ptop | S)
7: if ∆f (ptop | S) ≥ top of Q {ranks top} then
8: S := S ∪ {ptop}
9: else
10: insert ptop in Q with updated ∆f (ptop | S)
11: end if
12: end while
13: return S
the analyst, we mark all anomalies in Ap in red and the
rest in A\Ap in blue – c.f. Fig. 1.
3.2.2 Subset selection Having defined our explana-
tion objective, we need to devise a subset selection algo-
rithm to optimize Eq. (3.1), for a budget b. Note that
optimal subset selection is a combinatorial task.
Fortunately, our objective f(·) exhibits three key
properties that enable us to use a greedy algorithm with
an approximation guarantee. Specifically, we can show
that our set function f : 2P → R+ is
i. non-negative; since the anomaly scores take non-
negative values, often in [0, 1];
ii. monotonic; as for every S ⊆ T ⊆ P, f(S) ≤ f(T ).
That is, adding more plots to a set cannot decrease
the maximum score attributed to any anomaly;
iii. and submodular ; since for every S ⊆ T ⊆ P and for
all p ∈ P\T , f(S∪{p})−f(S) ≥ f(T ∪{p})−f(T ) .
That is, adding any plot p to a smaller set can
increase the function value at least as much as
adding it to its superset.
We give the submodularity proof in Appendix A, as
non-negativity and monotonicity are trivial to show.
Submodular functions with non-negativity and
monotonicity properties admit approximation guaran-
tees under a greedy approach identified by Nemhauser
et al. [22]. The greedy algorithm starts with the empty
set S0. In iteration t, it adds the element (in our case,
pair plot) that maximizes the marginal gain ∆f in func-
tion value, defined as
∆f (p|St−1) = f(St−1 ∪ {p})− f(St−1) .
That is,
St := St−1 ∪ {arg max
p∈P\St−1
∆f (p|St−1)} .
Based on their proof, one can show that when t = b,
f(Sb) ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
max
|S|≤b
f(S) .
In other words, the simple greedy search heuristic
achieves at least 63% of the objective value of the
optimum set.
Algorithm 1 shows the psuedocode of our Look-
Out pair plot selection process.
3.3 Complexity Analysis
Lemma 3.1. LookOut scales linearly in terms of the
input size, i.e. number of edges in the input t-graph.
Proof. The complexity of feature extraction (Section
2.2) is the most computationally demanding part of
LookOut, and requires time linear on the number of
edges in the graph—since all features are defined on the
incident edges per node.
We show that the other two parts—scoring the
given anomalies (Section 3.1) and selecting pair plots
to present (Section 3.2)—add only a constant time, and
are independent of the graph size.
Let us denote by d the number of features we
extract. For scoring, we generate 2-d representations
by pairing the features. For each pair, we train an
iForest model in 2-d. Following their recommended
setup, we typically sample 256 points (i.e., nodes)
from the data and train around t = 100 extremely
randomized trees, called isolation trees. The complexity
of training an iForest is O(tψ logψ), and scoring a set of
|A| = k anomalous points takes O(tk logψ). The total
scoring complexity is thus O(d2t(k + ψ) logψ), and is
independent of the total number of nodes or edges in
the input graph.
At last, we employ the greedy selection algorithm,
where we compute the marginal gain of adding each plot
to our select-set, which takes O(d2k) and pick the plot
with the largest gain through a linear scan in O(d2). We
repeat this process b times until the budget is exhausted.
The total selection complexity is thus O(d2kb), which is
also independent of graph size.
Thus, having extracted the features in O(m),
LookOut takes constant additional time to produce its
output, where all of {d, ψ, t, k, b} are (small) constants
in practice. 
3.4 Discussion Here we answer some questions that
may be in the reader’s mind.
1. How do we define “anomaly?” We defer this question
to the off-the-shelf anomaly detection algorithm (iForest
[19], LOF [6], DB-outlier [16], etc.) Our focus here is
to succinctly and interpretably show what makes the
pre-selected items stand out from the rest.
Table 2: Datasets studied.
Dataset Nodes Edges Time Descrip.
Enron [26] 151 20K 3 yrs email comm.
DBLP [1] 1.3M 19M 25 yrs coathorship
LBNL [23] 2.5K 0.2M 1 hr IP-IP comm.
2. Why pair plots? Using pair plots for justification
is an essential, concious choice we make for several
reasons: (a) scatterplots are easy to look at and quickly
interpret (b) they are universal and non-verbal, in that
we need not use language to convey the anomalousness
of points – even people unfamiliar with the context of
Enron will agree that the point “Jeff Skilling” in Fig.
1 is far away from the rest, and (c) they show where
the anomalies lie relative to the normal points – the
contrastive visualization of points is more convincing
than stand-alone rules.
3. How do we choose the budget? We designed our
explanation objective to be budget-conscious, and let
the budget be specified by the analyst. In general,
humans have a working memory of size “seven, plus or
minus two” [21].
4 Experiments
In this section, we empirically evaluate LookOut on
three, diverse datasets. Our experiments were designed
to answer the following questions:
[Q1] Quality of Explanation: How well can Look-
Out “explain” or “blame” the given anomalies?
[Q2] Scalability: How does LookOut scale with the
input graph size and the number of anomalies?
[Q3] Discoveries: Does LookOut lead to interesting
and intuitive explanations on real world data?
These are addressed in Sec. 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.
Before detailing our empirical findings, we describe the
datasets used and our experimental setup.
4.1 Dataset Description To illustrate the general-
ity of our proposed domain-agnostic t-graph features
and LookOut itself, we select our datasets from di-
verse domains: e-mail communication (Enron), co-
authorship (DBLP) and computer (LBNL) networks.
These datsets are publicly available, unipartite directed
graphs. We describe them below and provide a sum-
mary in Table 2.
Enron: This dataset consists of 19K emails exchanged
between 151 Enron employees during the period sur-
rounding the scandal1 (May 1999-June 2002). The com-
munications are on daily granularity.
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enron_scandal
Figure 3: LookOut explains away top 10-30 anoma-
lies with 4-5 plots. Results shown on LBNL (left) and
Enron (right) with k = {10, 20, 30} anomalies (top to
bottom).
LBNL: This dataset details network traffic between
2.5K computers during a one hour interval known to
contain network attacks (e.g., port scans). Traffic is
recorded at second granularity.
DBLP: This dataset contains the co-authorship net-
work of 1.3M authors over 25 years from 1990 to 2014.
The networks are collected at yearly granularity.
4.2 Experimental Setup To obtain “ground-truth”
anomalies for LookOut input, we use the iForest [19]
algorithm on features described in Sec. 2.2 for each t-
graph. This yields a ranked list of points with scores in
[0, 1] (higher value suggests higher abnormality), from
which we pick the desired top k. Analogously, we use
iForest for computing the anomaly score in each pair
plot. We note that the analyst is free to choose any
anomaly detector(s) for both/either of the above stages,
making LookOut detector-agnostic. However, it is
recommended that the same methods be used for both
stages to ensure ranking similarities.
4.3 Quality of Explanation We quantify the qual-
ity of explanation provided by a set of plots S through
Figure 4: LookOut scales linearly with number of
edges (left) and number of anomalies (right).
their incrimination score:
(4.2) incrimination(S) = f(S)|A|
where A is the set of input anomalies and f(·) is
the objective funtion defined in Eq. 3.1. Intuitively,
incrimination is the average maximum blame that an
input anomaly receives from any of the selected plots.
Due to the lack of comparable prior works, we use a
na¨ıve version of our approach, called LookOut-Na¨ıve
which ignores the submodularity of our objective. In-
stead, LookOut-Na¨ıve assigns a score to each plot by
summing up scores for all given anomalies and chooses
the top b plots for a given budget b.
Fig. 3 compares the incrimination scores of both
LookOut-Na¨ıve and LookOut on the Enron and
LBNL datasets for several choices of k and b. The
red dotted line indicates the ideal value, f(P), i.e., the
highest achievable incrimination (by selecting all plots).
Fig. 3 shows that LookOut consistently outperforms
LookOut-Na¨ıve and rapidly converges to the ideal in-
crimination with increasing budget. Results on DBLP
were similar, but excluded for space constraints.
4.4 Scalability We empirically studied how Look-
Out runtime varies with (i) the graph size m and (ii)
the number of anomalies k. All experiments were per-
formed on an OSX personal computer with 16GB mem-
ory. Runtimes were averaged over 10 trials.
To measure scalability with respect to graph size,
we sampled edges from [100K, 10M ] in logarithmic
intervals from DBLP while fixing budget to b = 5 and
k = 50 anomalies. Fig. 4 (left) plots runtime vs. number
of edges, demonstrating a linear fit with slope ≈ 1. This
empirically confirms Lem. 3.1.
We also study the variation of runtime with the
number of anomalies, as feature extraction incurs a
constant overhead on each dataset. Fig. 4 (right)
illustrates linear scaling with respect to number of
anomalies for a DBLP subgraph with 10K edges.
4.5 Discoveries In this section, we present our
discoveries using LookOut on all three real world
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 5: Discoveries using LookOut on de-
tected anomalies: LookOut partitions and explains
anomaly detection results from iForest on DBLP (a-b)
and LBNL (c-f) datasets.
datasets. Scoring in 2-d was performed using iForest
with t = 100 trees and sample size ψ = 64 (Enron) and
ψ = 256 (LBNL and DBLP). We use dictated anoma-
lies for Enron, and detected anomalies for LBNL and
DBLP datasets to demonstrate performance in both
settings.
Enron: We used two top actors in the Enron scandal,
Kenneth Lay (CEO) and Jeff Skilling (CFO) as dic-
tated anomalies for LookOut and sought explanations
for their abnormality based on internal e-mail commu-
nications. With b=2, LookOut produced the plots
shown in Fig. 1 (right). Explanations indicate that Jeff
Skilling had an unsually large IAT-max for the number
of employees he communicated with (outdegree). On
the other hand, Kenneth Lay sent emails to an abnor-
mally large number of employees (outdegree) given the
time range during which he emailed anyone (lifetime).
DBLP: We obtained ground truth anomalies by run-
ning iForest on the high-dimensional space spanned
by a subset of features from Sec. 2.2. With k =
5, the detected anomalous authors were Alberto L.
Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, H. Vincent Poor, Hao
Wang, Jack Dongarra and Thomas S. Huang. The ex-
planations provided by LookOut with b = 2 are
shown in Fig. 5a-b. Thus, the anomalous authors users
are partitioned into two groups. The members of the
first group, Alberto L. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli,
H. Vincent Poor, Jack Dongarra, and Thomas S.
Huang are anomalous because they had usually high du-
ration during which they published papers (lifetime)
and total number of co-authorships (inweight-r). This
is consistent with their high h-indices obtained from
their respective google scholar pages (see brackets in
Fig. 5a). The second group consists of only Hao Wang,
who was also anomalous in this plot, but is best ex-
plained by very high IAT-variance for his inweight-r
value, shown in Fig. 5b.
LBNL: We ran LookOut with k=10 and b=4 and
obtained the output pair plots as shown in Fig. 5c-f. We
observe the different anomalous nodes that have been
incriminated differently depending on the pair plot.
Port 524 is highlighted in Fig. 5c due to its very low
IAT-avg and IAT-variance hinting at it being hotspot
port with a large number of transmissions at a quick
continuous rate.
Fig. 5d shows 4 anomalies including Port 515 and
Port 4201. In fact, Port 515 handles requests based
on the Line Printer Daemon Protocol which establishes
network printing services. Our observations of a high
IAT-min over a long lifetime are in tandem with print
requests being polled over the network at fixed time
intervals.
Fig. 5e incriminates Port 80, Port 443 and Port
5730. Port 80 is the designated port for the internet
hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) and helps retrieve
HTML data from web servers. As such, we observe
that Port 80 has an extremely high indegree and
outdegree, indicating that this port is used for a
large number of diverse connections between several
web servers. Its contemporary counterpart Port 443
is assigned for secure communications (HTTPS) and is
thus incriminated for the same identifying reasons as
the former.
Port 2888 in Fig. 5f is used by ZooKeeper, a cen-
tralized coordination service for distributed applica-
tions like Hadoop2. It appears with an abnormally
low lifetime and IAT-variance probably indicating a
small active transmission time which involved a quick
configuration broadcast between devices.
Note that on all datasets, anomalous points are
clearly visually distinguishable, and often complemen-
2https://wiki.apache.org/hadoop/ZooKeeper
tary between pair plots. This is in line with our desired
explanation task, and achieved as a result of our Look-
Out subset selection objective and approach.
5 Related Work
While there is considerable prior work on anomaly de-
tection [7, 4, 13], literature on anomaly description is
comparably sparse. Several works aim to find an op-
timal feature subspace which distinguishes anomalies
from normal points. [15] aims to find a subspace which
maximizes differences in anomaly score distributions of
all points across subspaces. [18] instead takes a con-
straint programming approach which aims to maximize
differences between neighborhood densities of known
anomalies and normal points. An associated problem
focuses on finding minimal, or optimal feature sub-
spaces for each anomaly. [16] aims to give “intensional
knowledge” for each anomaly by finding minimal sub-
spaces in which the anomalies deviate sufficiently from
normal points using pruning rules. [8, 9] use spectral
embeddings to discover subspaces which promote high
anomaly scores, while aiming to preserve distances of
normal points. [20] instead employs sparse classification
of an inlier class against a synthetically-created anomaly
class for each anomaly in order to discover small feature
spaces which discern it. [17] proposes combining deci-
sion rules produced by an ensemble of short decision
trees to explain anomalies. [5] augments the per-outlier
problem to include outlier groups by searching for single
features which differentiate many outliers.
All in all, none of these works meet several key
desiderata for anomaly description: (a) quantifiable ex-
planation quality, (b) budget-consciousness towards an-
alysts (returning explanations which do not grow with
size of the anomalous set), (c) visual interpretability,
and (d) a scalable descriptor, which is sub-quadratic
on the number of nodes and at worst polynomial on
(low) dimensionality. Table 3 shows that unlike exist-
ing approaches, our LookOut approach is designed to
give quantifiable explanations which aim to maximize
incrimination, respect human attention-budget and vi-
sual interpretability constraints, and scale linearly on
the number of graph edges.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we formulated and tackled the problem
of succinctly and interpretably explaining anomalies in
t-graphs to human analysts. We identified a number of
domain-agnostic features of t-graphs, and subsequently
made the following contributions: (a) problem formu-
lation: we formulate our goal for explaining anomalies
using a budget of visually interpretable pair plots, (b)
explanation algorithm: we propose a submodular ob-
Table 3: Comparison with other anomaly description
approaches, in terms of four desirable properties.
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Quantifiable Explanations 4 4 4 4 4
Budget-conscious 4 4
Visually Interpretable 4
Scalable 4 4 4 4
jective to quantify explanation quality and propose the
LookOut method for solving it approximately with
guarantees, (c) generality: we show that LookOut
can work with diverse domains and any detection algo-
rithm, and (d) scalability: we show theoretically and
empirically that LookOut scales linearly in the size of
the input graph. We conduct experiments on real e-mail
communication, co-authorship and IP-IP interaction t-
graphs and demonstrate that LookOut produces qual-
itatively interpretable explanations for “ground-truth”
anomalies and achieves strong quantitative performance
in maximizing our proposed objective.
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A Proof of Submodularity
Our explanation objective is defined as:
max
S⊂P,|S|=b
f(S) =
∑
ai∈A
max
pj∈S
si,j
Next we show that the set function f is submodular.
Proof. Consider two sets S and T , S ⊆ T ⊆ P, and the
function,
F(pk,S, T ) = ∆f (pk | S)−∆f (pk | T ) .
By definition of submodularity, function f is sub-
modular if and only if,
F(pk,S, T ) ≥ 0 ∀ pk ∈ P \ T .
For simplicity lets write F as,
F(pk,S, T ) =
∑
ai∈A
ti
where each term ti is given as
ti = [max(si,k,max
pj∈S
si,j) −max(si,k,max
pj∈T
si,j
+ max
pj∈T
si,j −max
pj∈S
si,j ] .
Now we consider the following three cases:
Case 1. For some ai ∈ A ∃ pj′ ∈ S s.t. si,j ≥ si,k,
then,
max(si,k,max
pj∈S
si,j) = max
pj∈S
si,j ,
and similarly since S ⊆ T , pj′ ∈ T
max(si,k,max
pj∈T
si,j) = max
pj∈T
si,j .
∴ for all such ai ∈ A, ti = 0 .
Case 2. For some ai ∈ A @ pj′ ∈ S s.t. si,j′ ≥ si,k and
∃ pj′ ∈ T s.t. si,j′ ≥ si,k , then,
max(si,k,max
pj∈S
si,j) = si,k
and conversely,
max(si,k,max
pj∈T
si,j) = max
pj∈T
si,j
∴ for all such ai ∈ A, ti = si,k −max
pj∈S
si,j ≥ 0 .
Case 3. For some ai ∈ A @ pj′ ∈ T s.t. si,j′ > si,k,
then,
max(si,k,max
pj∈T
si,j) = si,k
and similarly since S ⊆ T ,
max(si,k,max
pj∈S
si,j) = si,k .
∴ for all such ai ∈ A,
ti = max
pj∈T
si,j − max
pj∈S
si,j ≥ 0 (∵ A ⊆ B)
As a result of all three possible cases we see that
ti ≥ 0 ∀ ai ∈ A. Hence,
F(pk,S, T ) =
∑
ai∈A
ti ≥ 0
∴ F(pk,S, T ) ≥ 0 ∀ pk ∈ P \ T
We conclude that the set function f is submodular. 
